JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The very least we may demand of the sponsors of a "Type Method" to be worth its salt is that they have clear in mind the concept of type, and prove capable to discriminate among its various aspects. In so demanding, we do not press philosophical or legal requirements beyond the rational capacity of the average botanist, rather, we beg that everybody at least knows what he is talking about, for in the contrary case it is useless to discuss. In sum, before patiently tolerating the flag-weaving of those who believe that the American Code clarified the concept of type, we should like to ask that the gentlemen sit down and ponder, for the contrary is certainly the truth.
designation of a type-subspecies does not call as a first step for the recognition of a certain specimen in preference to another; it calls, on the contrary, for the preliminary recognition of a certain taxonomic unit of subordinate rank (in this case, the trinomial genuina), which unit is only in a second time interpreted in the light of a suitable specimen, figure or description. When I say that E. heterophylla is typified by its subdivision genuina Boiss. 1862, I affirm nothing which a normally well informed botanist may fail to understand. It is taken for granted that a species is typified by that subdivision which precisely answers thc original concept, whether already published (as E. heterophylla genuina Boiss., 1862) or still unpublished (as could be Planta vulgaris vulgaris unpublished in 1952, but legitimately to be published by John Doe in 2002). Under this subdivision may lie any number of specimens, descriptions or illustrations, which is finally to say that the designation of this particular subdivision is not tantamount to identifying as typical some one specimen, description or illustration in particular. The difference here may seem to the uncritical hardly worth mentioning, but it involves in reality two very different concepts of type, one physical (specimen, description, figure), the other nomenclatorial (subdivision identified, or to be identified, by a name). Problems of the knottiest may arise in actual practice which call for a sharp discrimination of these concepts, and abusing a nomenclatorial type may bring about results quite as unwelcome as mishandling a physical one, which we are soon to learn through factual examples.
In conclusion: Three are the concepts of type, which I may briefly refer to as physical, biological and nomenclatorial. Be it observed that all these concepts are eventually understood in the light of something tangible -specimen, description, figure -so that a whole family, quite as much as a single form, are in the end typified by this something tangible. No one, nevertheless, would think of confusing a family with a form on the ground that both, after all, hark back to a specimen. The specimen, or its equivalents, are one concept; the endless chain of taxonomic groups based upon this specimen, or its physical equivalents, are quite another concept.
With this clear before us, let us turn now to the pages of the American Code. Perusing its "Section IV. Application of Names" we read, "Canon 15. The nomenclatorial type of a species or subspecies is the specimen to which the describer originally applied the name in publication .... " Canon 15 -roundly violated as we are soon to learn by one of its original proponentscontains nothing which may be said to be new or striking, even less unknown to the generality of European taxonomists long before 1905. Canon 14 on its part embodies a gross confusion in concepts, mistaking a physical type (specimen, description and/or figure) with a nomenclatorial one (typical subdivision). Had the authors of Canon 14 thought themselves out in a critical manner about types they could not fail to see as Eupsilogramme is the nomenclatorial type of Psilogramme so must Planta vulgaris (var.) vulgaris be the nomenclatorial type of P. vulgaris. In the end, both Psilogramme and P. vulgaris come to rest upon physical types, so that -adopting the confusion in concepts advanced by the founding fathers of the American Code -we should consistently but falsely maintain that Psilogramme, too, has for its nomenclatorial type a specimen. The immediate result of the American blunder was that the new fangled transatlantia "Type Method" broke down next immediately to international presentation. Briquet finally reported upon it in these terms (Texte Synopt. Docum. Congrbs Vienne 90. 1905), "The American authors d'une fa4on g6n6rale, entendent comme "type de nomenclature" la subdivision qui lorsqu'un groupe est divis6 ou remani6 doit conserver le nom primitif"4 This is not so at all; Britton and his friends understood as "Type de Nomenclature" not only the pars typica of a name (the like they did in Canon 15) but also a physical type (specimen, description, figure, spoken of in Canon 14), thoroughly confusing the two concepts. Briquet, misunderstanding them, gave them nevertheless credit for consistency, which they did not deserve in the first place. He did not take them for the poor amateurs they actually were in matters nomenclatural, and this was unfortunate. Had the American founding fathers of the Code been required to think a little harder before going to record with halfbaked generalities a great deal of recrimination, boasting, quibbling, claiming and counterclaiming would have been nipped in the bud.
That Britton, to mention by name one of the most outspoken advocates of the American Code, was only a putterer in the field of nomenclature is thoroughly well known to critical students of his work. To his stubborn rejection of the Vienna International Rules the nomenclature and classification of the Cactaceae, for example, owes some of the knottiest problems in typification, not only, but the wilful, needless stultification of a long tradition. The age-old European feeling that correct typification is not a fit subject of straightjackets, rather a discriminate handling of oftentimes complex biological and systematic issues on the part of a competent monographer, is doubtless vindicated by such examples as I have introduced in the understanding that examples of the same sort could easily be multiplied if space only allowed. In sum, let it be affirmed that, (1) Mismanaging the concept and application; of nomenclatorial types (e.g., Euechinocactus, Cactus mammillaris, etc.) can bring about results quite as unwelcome -and perhaps more so on the whole -as the uncertainty in the application of some physical type; (2) The American Code never was a reliable guide to the proper understanding of a correct "Type Method", its own makers blundering indeed egregiously in the easiest of cases, there, in sum, where no European master would have blundered long before the days of Britton & Co.
Let us next turn to Art, 18 in the third edition of the Rules, which American botanists very proudly, but quite as mistakenly, extol as their gem in the otherwise supposedly rickety crown of ageing European nomenclature. This Article recites as follows: "The application of names of taxonomic groups is determined by means of nomenclatural types. A nomenclatural type is that constituent element of a group to which the name of the group is permanently attached as an accepted name or as a synonym. The name of a group must be changed if the type of the name is excluded (see Art. 66). The type of the name of an order or suborder is a family, that of the name of a family, subfamily, tribe or subtribe is a genus, that of a generic name is a species, that of the name of a species or group of lower rank usually a specimen or preparation. In some species, however, the type is a description or figure given by a previous author. Where permanent preservation of a specimen or preparation is impossible, the application of the name of a species is determined by means of the original description or figure. Note: The nomenclatorial type is not necessarily the most typical or representative element of the group; it is merely that element with which the name of a group is permanently associated. Examples: the type of the name Malvales is the family Malvaceae; the type of the name Malvaceae is the genus Malva; the type of the name Malva is the species Malva sylvestris L.; the type of the name Polyporus amboinensis Fries is the figure and description in Rumph. Herb. Amboin. VI, p. 129, t. 57, fig. 1 ."
This Article is thoroughly ludicrous, which I say advisedly and maintain against all comers. In the first place, the author, or authors, of this epic pasticcio are quite as inept in their conceptual handling of types as ever were the founding fathers of the American Code. They speak, of course, of a nomenclatorial, or nomenclatural, type (e.g., family typifying an order; species typifying a genus, etc.); of a physical type (specimen, preparation, description or figure); of a biological type ("The most typical or representative element of the group", as spoken of in the Note) but hopelessly confuse the first two, precisely as did the American Code, failing in addition to properly qualify the third with the necessary clause, "The most typical or representative element of the group in the biological sense". In sum, this "Type-Method" right there fails, where the ultimate concept of what is, or may be, a type is up for critical, precise definition. The wording itself of this all is incompetent and dubious; if it be true that "A nomenclatural type is that constituent element of a group to which the name of the group is permanently attached", and that, accordingly, Malva and the Malvaceae cannot be set asunder ever, it remains to be seen why Art. 18 should specifically refer to Art. 66, which states "If the genus Portulaca were excluded from the family now known as Portulacaceae, the residual group could no longer bear the name Portulacaceae and would have to be renamed". Well, then: How may we suppose that Portulaca might be taken out of the Portulacaceae, when Malva can never be segregated out of the Malvaceae by explicit definition in the very Art. 18? These Articles, 18 and 66, compound nonsense on the face of their own wordings, and only then could they be defended, if we agree that, after all, the intelligent reader is to draw his own conclusion, which is not the earmark of a competent body of rulings, whatever its purpose and nature might be. Further: It remains to be explained why, having elected the group centering around Malva as their example, from the order down to the species, the author, or authors, of Art. 18 should jump out of Malva sylvestris into Polyporus amboinensis, without so much as heeding the thoroughly normal contingency that a critically minded inquirer asks, what is the status of Malva sylvestris var. sylvestris (or its equivalents in nomenclature and typification). Is this trinomial to be deemed a "specimen", "preparation", "description" and/or "figure" or, peradventure, rather more a genuine "nomenclatorial type"? It seems in addition likely that the introduction of Polyporus amboinensis to the record in Art. 18 is anything but happy. Rumphius' figuire has only then status in modern nomenclature insofar as Fries gave it currency, which is to say that Rumphius' figure has no special status other than that of the countless pre-Linnaean illustrations "legitimized", e.g., in the pages of the Species Plantarum, 1753. It thus remains to be seen what Art. 18 actually means when specifying that, "In some species, however, the type is a description or a figure given by a previous author". What previous author, and why? Jammed into the modern Rules by incompetent sponsors, Art. 18 flatly conflicts -as we may rightfully anticipate -with other texts in the same Rules wherein type-subdivisions of species are mentioned which are not at all "specimens", "preparations", "descriptions" and/or "figures", witness Art. 30 ("Subdivisions of the same species .... based on the same type"). Rec. XVIII (subdivisions of a s~pecies which include the type either of a higher subtlivisional name or of the specific epithet"); Rec. XXXV ("Subdivision which included the type of the specific epithet"). Throughout these provisos, whether mandatory oi advisory, speaks the old lore, a lore thoroughly conversant with the concept of genuine nomenclatorial types in a subspecific rank, the old lore of the masters of Geneva and Europe which the halfbaked notions of Britton & Co. pretented to rule out as unbecoming a new "biological age". Much could be added, but to add would only spoil when tittering is in order. Alas, what a grandiose mess.
Compressed to its ultimate essences, Art. 18 could be made to read approximately thus, "Every taxonomic group is, or can be, typified by a group of immediately lower rank (nomenclatorial type); in the end, the sum total of these groups is, singly and/or jointly, restricted in application by reference to a specimen, preparation, description and/or figure (physical type), in the understanding that neither the nomenclatorial nor the physical type may be rue to the biological average, (or biological type) of the groups in question. Typifying and typified groups cannot be separated; e.g., Malva (typifying group) is forever integral part of the Malvaceae (typified group), quite as much as is to be integral part of the concept under a name the physical type originally so designated by the author of the name". It can safely be advanced that such an Article as this would embody nothing which is more genuinely "American" than "European" because it contains only truisms of the most palpable sort, something, in sum, which has permeated practising botany in some form or other everywhere from the very start of binomial nomenclature. In this light, it could be objected that the inclusion of a remodelled Art. 18 in the Rules would mean very little in the end, which is precisely what Briquet and his well informed coworkers knew all along, and I myself hold to be hardly open to question. It could further be objected that, being as such meaningless, a better arranged Art. 18 should be implemented with a host of hard and fast dicta in the spirit of the old American Code in order to become meaningful in the choice of "Types", and the use of "cotypes", "syntypes", "lectotypes", "kleptotypes", and all manners of more or less useful and melanchonious "types". To this last objection I would for one take exception, for science in general, and nomenclature in particular, is not to be a dance of dervishes yelling themselves hoarse in quest of the perfect taxonomic paradise. Let us ponder the lesson afforded by the Species lectotypicae propositae, and take of botany rather more a critical than a mechanical view. The most minute Rules and Recommendations will never cover all cases, and it is fitting that a body of laws, whether botanical, zoological or otherwise, be approached with due reverence and understanding by gentlemen who are neither incompetent nor ignorant. The trouble with us today is not about this or that "Type Method", or the like, rather more with the circumstance that every Tom, Dick and Harry thinks he has a vested right of tinkering with profound principles and most critical issues in a thoroughly irresponsible spirit, preaching at the best like Britton and acting at the worst like Britton. In he end, if writing into the Rules, a "Type Method" is to save us from the press of the incompetent and the ignorant, I am doubtless for it as the lesser evil. Were I interested in anything but fundamentals, I should give time over to the task of showing how inept is on occasion the new "Type Method" even as to its own pet definitions. For example: Art. 21 states that, "If it is later proved that.... a type, herbarium sheet or preparation, contains parts belonging to more than one taxon, the name must remain attached to that part (lectotype) which corresponds more nearly with the original description". Precepts of the sort are, of course, useless padding, quite as would be the "order" that a fork is properly to be held elsewhere than by the prongs: I would like to be shown a taxonomist who facing a "mixed" specimen accepts as "typical" that part of it going against the description. Moreover, it seems evident that if herbarium-material contains heterogeneous specimens, the one to which the original description applies is the holotype -not the lectotype, the like Art. 21 claims -the balance of the material being to be rejected as an erroneous addition. The very concept of lectotype implies choice out of basically homogeneous material, which the authors of Art. 21, as quoted, hardly seem to know.
However, all this is peanuts, as we might say, and nothing else can be expected of "legislators" who are not clear as to fundamentals; to their efforts the dictum applies: The finer they split, the thicker they litter.
Beyond comparison more serious is the fact that Art. 21 still trumpets half a century later the hoary misstatement of the American Code that the "Nomenclatural type" of a species, or of a group below the species, is a "Single specimen". Pathetic is the circumstance that fifty years of "codification", international gatherings, etc., have not made a dent in the confusion originally perpetrated by Britton & Co. in the very concept of "type".
Considering that the mess still concocted in 1950 around this concept stems at bottom from the fundamental inability of certain presumptuous botanists to think this concept out once for ever, it is not surprising that articles in the Stockholm Code other than those of the "Type Method" so called suffer disfigurement because of this same inability. To illustrate: Art. 34 recites, "For nomenclatural purposes, a species or any taxon below the rank of species is regarded as the sum of its lower taxa, if any (sic). The description of a subordinated taxon which does not include the nomenclatural type of the higher taxon automatically creates a second subordinated taxon of the same rank which has as its nomenclatural type. the type of the higher taxon (see Art. 35). Example: The publication in 1843 of Lycopodium inundatum var. bigelowii Tuckerm. automatically creates another variety which is the type of Lycopodium inundatum". This thick verbiage can be pierced only by making reference to the example. Its authors hazily have in mind something which is the publication of the typical trinomial, which publication they would like from now on to take place according to certain esoteric formulae, something answering Ewan's outlandish wish (see main text) to have a "Definite name of reference without involving nomenclature." I will factually observe, i) It is not only a species, or a taxon below it, that is to be regarded as the sum of its lower taxa. A genus is the sum of its subgenera; a family of its subfamilies, etc. Accordingly, the introductory statement in Art. 34 is a misleading platitude without relation to the purpose and body of said Article. ii) It is false as a matter of plain fact that the publication of Lycopodium inundatum var. , who is the "automatic creator" of L. spicata var. spicata. I should think it is Lamarck, though the principle of "Automatic creation" is absolutely repugnant to every nomenclatural concept, which demands that taxa, whatever their rank and quality, be clearly defined in relation to an author, a date, and a place of publication. Thinking it is Lamarck I may be wrong, nevertheless, for I will have to look up who first published a variety under L. spicata, and the name of this chap may be that of the "automatic creator" of that trinomial (rather, "binary combination"). I pray to the Almighty that the author of the first publication under L. spicata has clearly identified its rank, whether variety, subspecies or form, because, failing this, I no longer know what to do. Anyhow, it. should be useless to learn the name of the "automatic creator" of L. spicata var. spicata, considering that this name cannot be affixed to the trinomial -be it only to identify it for purposes of orderly recording -by explicit fiat of Art. 35 in headlong defiance of Art. 55, which latter truly embodies fundamentals of genuine nomenclature.
Is there any reason, gentlemen wilfully puttering with nomenclature, and hanging from the neck of your ever-kind colleagues such gross nonsense, why you should not be told, at long last overdue: You do not know what you are doing, nor will you ever reform, because the record is final that you have been busy at it some 50 years.already. Will you, please, stay out of this field, which you do not at all understand. Your "Type Method" 's a parody, shot through with a fundamental misconception of "type" to agree with the crass "philosophy" of Britton & Co. Your Articles 34 and 35 are monstrosities answering esoteric notions of "type" in headlong conflict with nomenclatural principles tested in over a century of theory and practice, nor will such Articles ever factually work. In the wake of your misguided efforts ride darkness, disorder, confusion, decadence. Stay out of this, and let common sense speak again precise language. Nobody needs you: Go, learn but do not teach. You cannot teach, anyhow.
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